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COSTAREI.LI

11. MASSA CH USI~

In January ln74, a ppcll n.nt Costnrelli was charged with
knowing unauthorized use of a. motor vehicle, an offense
under Mass. Gen. Laws c. no, § 24 (2){a) (1975 Supp.) .
The offense carries a rn n..~ i mum senten<'.e of a $500 fine
and t.wo y<'ars imprisonment , and is subject to the twotier system described above. Prior to trial in the M unici·
pal Court, Cost~relli moved f~r a jury trial. The motion
was denied and the trial before the court resulted in a
judgment of guilty. A one year prison sentence was imposed. Costarelli thereupon lodged an appeal in the Su·
perior Court for Suffolk County.
Without awaiting proceedings in Superior Court, Costarelli took this appeal to this Court,11 seeking to establiSh
that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
a jury be available in his first trial. whether it be in the
Municipal Court or the Superior Court. He also raised
speedy trial and double jeopardy contentions as bars to
his retrial before a jury. On October 21 , 1974, we postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdic-

tion to the hearing on the merits.

419 U. S. 893. We
now dismiss for want of JUrisdiction. Title 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257 limits our review to the judgment of the highest
collateral consequences as revO<'.atJOn of parole or of a driver's
permit. These matters do not. affect, the result we announce today,
and merit no further dis(1Jssion
a There is some question as to whether re\·iew should have been
sought by way of a petJhon for certiorari rather than appeal
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), we havr appellate jurisdiction when
the constitutional validity of a statP statute is drawn in question
and the decision is in favor of its \'alidity. In the present case it
is not clear that the denial of a Jury m the first-tier trial resulted
from the operation of a statute rather than of custom and practice.
We need not resolve the issue, because it cannot affect our dispost..
tion-if not properly denominated an appeal , we would treat the
papers as a petition for certiorart, 28 U S. C. § 2103, and the
highest state court requirement of § 1257 appliee to petittoDB [or

eertiorari as well as to appeals.
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etate court in wh ich n dt>C' ISIOII co uld br had , and we
condudt> that this 18 not such n j udgmeut.

That a decision of a higher stat«> cuurt might ha.ve been
had in this cue is established by a recent decision of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Whitmarsh v.
Commonwealth,- Mass. - , 316 N . E. 2d 610 (1974) ,
in which another criminal defendant sought relief from
M&.!S&Chusetts' two-tier trial system. After conviction
without a jury in the first tier, Whitmarsh took his appeal to the superior court, but thereupon sought immediate review of his constitutional contentions in the Supreme Judicial Court. As one potential basis of that

court's jurisdiction, he asserted its power of "general
superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to
correct and prevent errors and abusee therein if no other
remedy i8 ezpreuly provided." Maaa. Gen. La.ws c. 211,
§ 3 (1968) (emphasis added). The Supreme Judicial
Court rejected this basis of jurisdiction on the ground
that another remedy was in fact expressly provided. It

stated:
"The constitutional issue the plaintiff now asks us
to decide is the same issue which he raised in the
District Court, and in the Superior Court by his motion to dismiss. If his motion were denied, and if
be were thereafter tried in the Superior Court and
found guilty, the plaintiff would have available to
him an opportunity for appellate review of the ruling on his motion as matter of right by saving and
perfecting exceptions thereto."

-

Mass., at - ,

316 N. E. 2d, at 613.
It ia thus clear that CostareUi can raiae hie conetitutJonal i•uee m Superior Court by • motion to diamiaa, and
ean obtain state appellate review of an adverse deo\llon
&brouP appeal to the state hiP coUrt. That \he ielue
JDJP$ be mooted by Ilia acquitf*l m Superior Court il of

-....-nR OUIIUII

CIWJ'AJtR!U e IVN&4CIICM81&

78---f\739-PER. CURIAM

OOSTARELLI u MA88ACHUSET11!

I

Superior ~ourt, and a method by which he may, if
neoeuary, appropriately preeerw that claim for aeeertion
in the Supreme Jud•c•al Court. The Supreme JudJCI&l
Court of Maaach u~tte. therefore, is "the highest court
of a tate m wh1ch a dcms1on could be had" on his claim.

Since no decision has been had in that court, we lack
Juriediction of this cue.
Appellant relies on lanauap from Lo.rgent v. Tezaa,
31 U S. 41 (1943), to support, a contrary result.
In that cue we reviewed a judgment of the County
Court of Lamar County, Texu. We d1d 10 t.. _ 1lllda- Teal law the Rate 00\IJ't eystem proWled ao ..,.a ffom that judplent of conviction. We
• ...._ .._ lt&te habet~ oorpue wu available to teet the
~

1iiQah
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IMJ•t had been oonvicted, but that it Wll
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the ftnallty of t.h1t fl.tWilllllfC JIHI&tnt!fll, or thn fa~t Ua•t
thJ• judarntmt wu uJ,talu,;fl ln tlan hhchttMf 111t.at,..
court av.Uabla UJ tJa,. llfll.,.ll&n~ ( t llt~tr•dmt ( 'o
v 8uTMrillr fltmrt, 2M 1 8 H, 14, /I"'Jtlint v Ztm.
mt~rman, :l7R I
li J 7fJ ' ld, at •~• 4:.&:1
The practnt ,.. il plainly diatln111lahahle Her• th•
MunktJ,.a Court prooeedin1 did n t, ft &lly tU pnu of
tile oltarp, and the prooetNfin1 in uperior C un Ia rwK
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The appeal ia diamwad for want of juriadictlon.
Bo onfered.

Ma. luaTle& DouOLAS took no part in the conaideration

or demlion of tbia eaae.
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